{"number":198,"title":"THE NINTH COMMANDEMENT","part":"THE THIRD PART OF MANS THANKFVLNES","questions":[112],"paragraphs":[],"clauses":[],"items":[],"text":"*Thov shalt not beare false witnesse against thy neighbour.*\n\n*The drift or end of this commaundement is the ordinaunce and maintenunce of the truth among men.* Neither is in this commandment only bearing of false witnes forbidden, but all those thinges which are of neere affinity therewith, the generall whereof is lying. *Thou shalt not beare false witnesse of thy neighbor, or against thy neighbour.* In this negatiue commandement is comprehended an affirmatiue, which is: Beare therefore true witnes of or for thy neighbour, that is, bee true, & desirous of learning & knowing the truth. The name of *Truth* here is taken for truenes or truth-speaking, that is, for the agreement or correspondence of our knowledge or speech with the thing, whereof our speech is. *True* we terme the speech it selfe agreeing with the thing.\n\n## The vertues of this ninth commaundement, together with their vices\n\nThe chiefe & principal vertue, which is here commanded, is *truth.* 1. *Truth* or truenes, is a vertue, whereby we loue true opinions & speeches, and seeke after them, & receiue them, and gladly professe and defend them, according as both our duty, and persons, places, times, and other circumstances require, vnto the glory of God, & the safety of our neighbor. This end maketh that the Diuel cānot be said to be true, although he somtimes speak that which is true. For his is true, who speaketh and loueth the truth, & doth affection it for the glory of God, and the safety of his neighbour. *Truth* may also be defined on this wise: *Truth* is a firme election in the wil, whereby we constantly embrace true sentences & opinions, speak that which is true, keepe couenants & promises, & auoide al deceitful dissemblings both in speech and outward gesture. *True confession is commaunded both in this, and in the third commaundement:* as often times the same vertu is required to the obedience of diuers commandements. *But in the third commandemēt true confession is required,* as it is the honour and worship of God, immediately respecting God: *and here it is commanded,* as there is a will in vs not to deceiue our neighbour, but to wishe his safety & welfare. Vnder the name of *truth* we comprise *liberty of speech,* which is a vertu wherby, as much as the time, place, & necessity requireth, we professe the truth freely, & boldly, & are not withdrawne through the fear of dangers.\n\n*Vnto truth, in the defect, are repugnant,* 1. *Al lies,* vnto which appertain al guiles, dissemblings, negligence in vnderstanding the truth of thinges, lies of courtesy; likewise slanders, backbitings, euil speakinges, which kindes of lying are repugnaunt also vnto Fairnesse of maners & conditions. *Lying,* is, to speak otherwise, or to signify otherwise by outward gestures, than thou thinkest, & than the thing it selfe is. So then in this commaundement principally is lying forbidden. *Vnto lying is referred also wilful ignoraunce,* which is a lying in the mind. *Officious lyes, or lyes of courtesie are to be auoided,* because euil is not to be doone, that good may come of it. And al lying that doth expressely dissemble the truth, is condemned. But a *truth* which is vttered by a figure, is no ly whether he vnderstand it or no, with whom we deale. This is to be obserued that we bee not too rigorous in examining the actiōs of the Saints; & also, that we excuse not those things which haue no neede to be excused. 1. Obiect. *That which profiteth another, and hurteth no man, is not sinne. A dutiful lie is of such qualitie. Therefore it is no sinne.* Answere. The Minor is false. Reply. *But yet the truth is often not to bee spoken.* Answere. We must not put a difference between the hiding of the truth and lying. Obiect. *God blesseth the midwiues, because thy told a lie. Therefore God alloweth and liketh of lies.* Aunswere. God therefore blesseth the mid-wiues, because they feared God, & slue not the infantes of the Israelites. 2. *Vnto truth, in the defect, is repugnaunt vanitie or leuitie,* which is a readines to lieng. He is *vain,* who lieth much, often, & easilie, and that without anie shame. *A lier is he, who hath a desire to lie. Vnto truth, in the excesse, is repugnant,* 1. *Vntimely professing of the truth, which is to cast pearles to swine, and to giue that which is holy vnto dogges,* as Christ saith, who by these words doth wholy forbid vnnecessarie and vntimely professing of the truth. For, as the verse hath it in the Poet, *He that warneth out of time, doth harme.* 2. *Curiositie,* which is to search after thinges vnnecessary, or vnpossible. These things may suffice for this chiefe and principall vertue of this ninth commandement. The vertues which folow, wait vpon trueth, and they all are as it were of truthes retinue.\n\n2 *Fairenesse of minde* is a vertu, which taketh wel things well or doubtfully spoken or done, and interpreteth them in the better part, to wit, as farre as there are any reasonable causes to induce thereto, & doth not easily conceiue suspicions, neither sticketh vpon suspicions, though they be such as are iust, & haue reasonable causes: hee doth not ground thereon, neither directeth his actions accordingly, neither decreeth or determineth ought by them. It is defined after this manner, *Faiernesse of minde* is a neighbour-vertue▪ vnto truth, allowing of others wils vpō probable reason, & hating all euil-mindednesse, & drawing also some things that are doubtfull to the better part; & hopeing in deede that which is good, but yet as touching mutable thinges thinking that the wils of men may change, and that a man may erre concerning anothers will, seeing the infoldings and secret places of mans mind are not beheld. *The Extremes* of this vertue, in the defect, are, *Slaundering and Suspiciousnesse. Slaundering,* is, not onelie falsly to criminate & attach the innocent, but also to interprete things indifferently spoken in the worser part, or also to interlace & coine some falshoode. *Suspiciousnes,* is, to take things well or ambiguously spoken in the worser part, to suspect euill thinges of those that are good, or to suspect without cause; or also to make to much of tru suspicions. It is lawful for vs somtimes to suspect, except we wil be fools. *Mat.* 10.16.17. *Beware of men: be ye wise as serpentes, & innocent as doues. In the excesse, foolish Credulitie, & foolish flatterie. Credulitie,* is, hastily or vnaduisedly to interprete any thing, or to assent to one without iust & probable cause: Or, to beleeue a thing of another, when there are manifest or probable reasons to the contrary. *Flatterie or assentation,* is, to praise or like things not to be praised, thereby to get either the goods or fauour of another man. *Fairenesse of mind,* is, an assistant or special kind of truth. Therfore it is also here together with trueth commanded.\n\n3 *Simplicitie,* which is open trueth without wrinkles or fetches and compassings: or, it is a vertue which doth properly and plainly speake and doe such thinges as are true, right and declared in artes & common life. Trueth is tempered with simplicity & fairenesse of mind or conditions. *The extremes of simplicitie are, Fained simplicitie, and Doublenesse in manners and conuersation.*\n\n4 *Constancie,* which is a vertue not departing from the knowen trueth, neither altering his purpose without good and necessary causes, but constantly speaking & dooing such thinges as are true, iust, & necessarie. Or, it is a vertue persisting in the trueth once found, knowen, & approued, & in the like maner professing & defending the same. Constancy is necessarie for the preseruation & maintenance of the trueth. Therefore it is here also commanded. *The extremes hereof in the defect, are Vnconstancie, or Lightnesse,* which is to alter true purposes & opinions without reason. *In the excesse the extremes are, Pertinacie or stoicall stifnesse and rigour,* which is a vice arising from a confidence in his owne wit, or from pride & ostentation, refusing to yeeld or depart from his opinion, albeit it bee such as hee seeth by strong reasons to be false, but persisting in false opinions, or vniust & vnprofitable actions.\n\n5 *Docilitie,* or a readinesse to learne, which is a vertue searching after the reasons of true opinions, easily beleeuing, & yeelding to those that teach or shew better things, & that vpon certaine reason, & framing his will ready to assent vnto true or probable reasons, & to leaue those thinges which before he held & embraced. The same are the *extremes* of Docilitie, which are of constācie, wherunto also this Docilitie is necessarie. For *Constancie without Docilitie degenerateth into Pertinacie; and Docilitie without Constancie degenerateth into Leuitie.* Now al these vertues which haue beene numbered agree and are linked verie well one with another. For *Trueth must bee tempered with Fairenesse of minde and Simplicitie, perceiued and knowen by Docilitie, preserued and maintained by Constancie.* And so these former vertues are required to the being of truth. Now the three vertues following are required to the profitable beeing of the trueth in the world.\n\n6 *Taciturnitie or silentnesse,* which is a vertue withholding in silence thinges secret & vnnecessarie to bee spoken, where, when, & as far as is needful; & auoiding ouer-much babling & talkatiuenes. Or, it is such a maner of professing the truth, whereby secret thinges, whether true, or false, are kept close; & speeches vnnecessarie & vnprofitable are auoided; especially vntimely, & pernicious speeches, & such as giue offence. *The extremes hereof,* in the defect, *are Pratling, foolish prating, and treacherie. Pratling,* is, not to be able to keepe close any thing. *Foolish Prating,* or futilitie & follie of speech, is to speake vnseasonably, immoderatelie, & foolishly. In the excesse, *Haughtinesse, Peeuishnesse,* & *dissembling of the trueth,* where are necessarie, or probable causes. *Peeuishnesse,* or *morositie,* is an ouer-much silentnesse & burying of the truth, where gods glorie & the safety of our neighbour, or our owne or others cause, or the loue of our friendes requireth vs to speake. *Silentnesse without affability becommeth Morositie or peeuishnesse, and Affabilitie without Silentnesse becommeth pratling, and foolish prating, babling out thinges hurtfull, vnnecessarie, vaine, or secret.*\n\n7 *Affability or readines of speaking,* which is a vertu gladly, & with signification of good wil hearing, answering, speaking where need is vpon a necessarie & probable cause; or it is a vertue easilie entertaining the mutual talkes of others, & giuing signification of the good wil in conferences, speech, & gestures. Or, *Gentlenes, facility, affabilitie,* consist in giuing care & making answere vnto others, with some signification of good wil. The same are the extremes of Affabilitie, which are of Taciturnitie, or Silentnesse: likewise leuitie, Assentation, or affectated & labored affabilitie.\n\n8 *Vrbanitie or pleasantnesse,* which is a vertue of speaking the trueth with a certain grace & elegancie, to teach, comfort, exhilarate, & nip or touch: or, it is a certain sauce of trueth & speech, to wit, the trueth figuratiuely vttered, either to mooue or delight others, without bitternesses, & keeping the circumstances of place, time & persons. The Extremes are, 1 *Scurrilitie, and Dicacitie. Scurrilitie* is obscene & homly iesting, especially in serious matters. *Scurra* (that is a scurrulous person) is so called from the Greeke worde 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth *dung:* because he speaketh filthinesse & dung. *Dicacitie* or scoffing is a vice of iesting bitterly, & of deriding, bourding and exagitating others, but especially such as are miserable. 2 *Stoliditie or Foolishnesse,* & *Sottishnesse or vnsauorinesse. Foolishinesse* is an vntimely affectation of vrbanitie. *Sottishnesse* is an absurd & vnsauorie affectation of vrbanitie. Now *Vrbanitie* is an especial gift of the wit, but may notwithstanding bee gotten by experience in matters. 3 *Backbyting,* which spreadeth false slaunders of others, constereth doubtfull speeches in the worse part, with a desire of reuenge, & an endeuor to hurt, or to raise enuie."}